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Evidentiary Considerations in Civil Cases
Maryland Judicial Institute
March 17, 2000
Lynn McLain
Character Evidence
A.

General Rule of Inadmissibility
5-404(a) (1st clause)
&
5-404(b) (1st clause):

B.

Character evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity -that a person acted in conformity
with his or her character on a particular occasion.

When Admissible

I.

For impeachment (to show likelihood to lie),
proof of character traits for truthfulness
and veracity, of any witness who has testified
(f.-404(a)(3)) and rehabilitation of witness
who has been impeached by certain methods

2.

As substantive proof for purpose
other than proving propensity

3.

Reputation

Opinion

Specific Instances

Yes

Yes

Only on cross of
character witness
('-405(a)) (But see also
Rules 5-608 and 5-609).

a.

Civil and criminal cases by
either party when character is
directly in issue ("essential
element of charge, claim, or
defense") (5-405(b)) (very rare, e.g.,
defamation, when truth is a defense)

Yes

Yes

Yes

b.

Proof of other crimes or acts to
show only motive, etc. (5-404(b ));
or acts by or reputation of victim,
if known to D, to show D's
state of mind. (This other purpose
must be relevant to the case; don't
lose sight of 5-401 and 5-403.)

No,
generally

No

Yes

As substantive proof of propensity to
act in conformity with character and
past conduct: only criminal cases

a.

In criminal cases, D may choose to
put hislher character in issue as
circumstantial proof of innocence
(then prosecution can rebut) (5-404( a)(l))

Yes

Yes

Only on cross of
character witness
(5-405(a))

b.

Character of victim where D
claims self-defense (see 5-404(a)(2))

Yes

Yes

Only on cross of character
witness (5-405(a)) (but see
2.b. above)

c.

Note: HABIT evidence is admissible under Rule 5-406.

d.·

Note special rules for persons alleging sexual assault (5-412) and, in federal court, for persons
sued for or charged with sexual assault (FRE 413-415)

I.

Character Evidence (for the text of the referenced rules, see infra pp. 12-16)
A.

Admissible either as substantive evidence (Rules 5-404 through 5-406) or only
as to credibility (impeachment or rehabilitation, Rules 5-608, 5-609, and 5-616).

B.

"The propensity rule" and its exceptions.
1.

"The propensity rule" generally excludes evidence of a person's other acts
or a person's character or character trait to show that the person acted "in
character" on the occasion at issue in the case. Rule 5-404(a)(1) and (b).
EXAMPLE: Plaintiff sues for severe injuries she alleges were caused by
defendant's driving his truck through a red light.
a.

Evidence that the plaintiffor the defendant is generally a bad driver
is offered to show that the plaintiff or the defendant drove badly
this time. Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

b.

Evidence that either one has driven through other red lights at other
times is offered. Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[But, as to criminal cases, see Sessoms v. State, _ Md. _ (Sept. Term,
1999, No. 68, Jan. 11,2000) where the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's exclusion of evidence that the rape prosecutrix's brother was
accused of robbing a third party hours after the alleged rape. Judge
Cathell, writing for the court, stated:
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in
criminal proceedings enunciated in Faulkner generally does not apply
to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by someone other than a criminal
defendant. * * * Because this rule is premised upon protecting an
accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude other
crimes evidence involving alleged actions by others testifying in the
criminal proceedings. This is especially so when the evidence is
crucial to the defense in a criminal proceeding and concerns
impeachment of a witness with a possible prejudice, bias, interest, or
motive to falsely testify.

Judge Wilner, dissenting, joined by Judges Rodowsky and Raker, would
have affirmed the trial judge's decision as an appropriate exercise of
discretion under Rule 5-403. The brother already had been impeached by
his prior convictions for robbery, including one the day after the alleged
rape.
2.

Exceptions to the propensity rule are carved out in several Rules.
a.

Evidence of repeated, similar acts that are specific enough to
constitute an individual's habit or a business or other organization's
routine practice is admissible as substantive evidence to prove that
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the person or organization acted in accordance with that routine on
the occasion in question anrial. Rule 5-406.
EXAMPLE: Plaintiffs husband's testimony that he has been her passenger
many times and she always buckles her seat belt before starting her car
engine is offered to show that she buckled it on the day of the accident in
question. Ruling:
b.

Limited exceptions in criminal cases only, regarding reputation or
opinion evidence of the accused's or the victim's pertinent character
trait, as substantive evidence. Rule 5-404(a)(l)(A) and (B) and
(2).

c.

Exceptions for impeachment: evidence of a person's prior
convictions (Rule 5-609), prior bad acts not resulting in conviction
(Rule 5-608(b)) and opinion or reputation evidence regarding that
person's bad character trait for truthfulness and veracity (Rule 5608(a)(1) & (3)(A)), are admissible to prove that the personeither a witness (Rule 5-404(a)(1)(C)) or a hearsay declarant (see
Rule 5-806) - acted "in character" and lied in the testimony or
statement admitted into evidence at trial. Rule 5-616(a)(6) and
(b)(5) & (6).

EXAMPLE: Plaintiff testified to the accident and to her injuries.
1.
May she be cross-examined about her 1995 conviction for
grand larceny? Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

d.

11.

About her having been fired for stealing from her
employer? Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

111.

May the defense call a character witness to testify to the
plaintiffs bad reputation for truthfulness, or to the witness's
opinion that the plaintiff is generally a liar? Ruling:

IV.

May the character witness testify as to whether he or she
believes the plaintiffs testimony in the case to be truthful?
Ruling:

Exception for rehabilitation: a witness whose credibility has been
impeached in such a way as to constitute an attack on the witness's
character for truthfulness (usually one or more of the three methods
in c. above, but the trial judge may find that, ~, a particular
impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement amounted to such
an attack) may be rehabilitated by reputation or opinion evidence
as to the witness's good character trait for truthfulness and veracity.
Rules 5-608(a)(2) and (3)(A), 5-404(a)(1)(C), and 5-616(c)(3).
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EXAMPLE: After the impeachment in c.i., ii., or iii. above, may plaintiff
call a character witness who will testify to plaintiffs good reputation for
truthfulness, or that, in the character witness's opinion, the plaintiff is
generally a truthful person? Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ __
C.

Admission of character evidence to prove something other than propensity.
1.

Specific prior instances to show motive, opportunity, intent, common
scheme or plan, preparation, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident with regard to the act at issue at trial. Rule 5-404(b).
EXAMPLE a: May plaintiff prove that the defendant had just robbed a
bank and was fleeing from the scene, to show why he would be likely to
run a red light? Ruling:
EXAMPLE b: If plaintiff alleges that defendant purposely ran into her,
may plaintifftestify that she had recently reported him to their employer
for sexual harassment? Ruling:

2.

Reputation testimony, opinion testimony, or evidence of specific instances,
to prove a person's character or character trait when it is an "essential
element of a [criminal] charge, [civil] claim, or defense .... " Rule 5405(b). Specific instances are allowed because someone's character must
be proven, as an element. Therefore, the most probative - and the most
time-consuming - method of proof is permitted.
EXAMPLE a: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant-Parent negligently
entrusted the family truck to Driver-Teenager. May Plaintiff prove
reputation of Teenager as a bad driver, and/or specific instances of
Teenager's prior reckless driving, known to Defendant-Parent?
Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
EXAMPLE b: Plaintiff sues Defendant for slander for telling Plaintiffs
prospective landlord that Plaintiff was a "druggie." Defendant defends by
alleging truth. May Defendant offer:
(i)
Reputation and opinion testimony that Plaintiff abuses
drugs? Ruling:
(ii)
Evidence of specific instances of Plaintiffs using illegal
drugs? Ruling:

D.

Methods of proof when "character witnesses" testify (in civil or criminal
cases, as to a principal witness's truthfulness and veracity, under Rule 5-608(a);
and, in criminal cases, under Rule 5-404(a)(1)(A) and (B)).
1.

Direct examination: reputation or opinion testimony, but not specific
instances. Rules 5-405(a) and 608(a)(1), (2), and (3),
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2.

Cross-examination: character witness may be asked about knowledge of
specific instances of the principal witness's conduct that would lead to a
reputation or opinion different than that to which the character witness
testified. Rules 5-405(a) and 5-608(a)(4).
EXAMPLE: Assume that the Plaintiff has testified and is being
impeached by a character witness.
a.

Direct examination of reputation witness: proponent establishes
that the character witness and the Plaintiff are members of the
same community (residential, work, school, etc.); that Plaintiff has
a reputation in that community as to character for truthfulness; and
that that reputation is bad.

b.

Direct examination of opinion witness: proponent establishes that
the character witness has a "reasonable basis" for having an
opinion regarding Plaintiffs character for truthfulness, ~, (at
least from July 1, 1994, until the Court of Appeals' August 31,
1999 decision in Jensen v. State) "I've worked next to her on the
assembly line for 5Yz years. We take our lunch and cigarette breaks
together." "In my opinion, she is not a truthful person." Compare,
~, Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445,453,397 A.2d 600 (1979)
(police officer who had brief encounter with witness when witness
had made larceny report, which officer concluded was false, lacked
sufficient basis for his opinion as to witness's truthfulness to be
admissible) with Barnes v. State, 57 Md. App. 50,57-60,468 A.2d
1040 (1984 ) (character witness had adequate basis for opinion
when she had known individual well for last two years, had been
acquainted with her for several years before that, and had
interviewed her several times to verify addresses and confirm
leads). But see d.-f. infra.

c.

Cross-examination of either, as to specific instances inconsistent
with the accuracy of the reputation or the opinion,~, "Did you
know (or have you heard) that in Plaintiffs night school class the
professor made an arithmetical error in Plaintiffs favor, and
Plaintiff voluntarily came forward to tell the professor so that the
professor could lower her grade?" The questioner may not provide
extrinsic evidence of this specific instance, which is admissible
only for the limited pUI]OSe of impeaching the character witness's
testimony.

d.

Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-115, adopted in 1971,
permits opinion testimony by a character witness "who has an
adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's
character." Before the adoption of Title 5, Hemingway v. State, 76
Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988), had found reversible error
when a trial judge restricted a defense character witness to
-5-

testifying only to "the length of time he had known [the homicide
victim] and his bald conclusion as to [the victim's] reputation for
violence."
Judge Karwacki, writing for the Court of Special Appeals
and relying on language by Chief Judge Gilbert in a 1975 case,
held that the trial judge should have permitted the defense to elicit
from its witness the specific matters on which the witness based his
opinion, first, so as to "convince the trial judge that the witness
possesses an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another
person's character." 76 Md. App. At 134. Secondly, Hemingway
held that the jury also should hear this evidence:
This does not mean, however, that the basis for the character witness's
opinion, if admitted, has no relevance to the weight ascribed to that
opinion by the jury. Clearly, the bald conclusion of the witness without
any reason to support it hardly commends the opinion for serious
consideration by the trier of the fact.

Id. at 135.
Thus, Hemingway mandated the courts' permitting the
character witness to state what it was that led him or her to form
the opinion to which the witness wished to testify.
e.

Hemingway v. State was overruled by Title 5, in an effort to keep
the direct testimony of a character witness short and sweet, i.e., to
limit it to reputation or opinion.
It was believed undesirable to open up side issues as to
whether specific instances that led the character witness to form an
opinion occurred or not -- particularly when the character evidence
is tangential, anyway. (The Rules permit specific instances to be
proved on direct when character is an "essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense." See C.2. supra, p. 4.)

Indeed, if one could testify to the specific instances that led
to one's opinion, the opinion testimony would be superfluous and
inadmissible under Rule 5-701, as unhelpful to the jury.
FRE 608 is rather obtusely written. Md. Rule 5-608 was
re-written in an effort to clarify, but not depart substantively from
FRE 608 (except that the Md. Rule rej ects one federal case [as well
as two 19th century Maryland cases] that permits character
witnesses to testify to whether they believe the other witness's trial
testimony).
For example, Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) explicitly states that
the character witness on direct "may give a reasonable basis for
-6-

testimony as to reputation or an opinion ... , but may not testify as
to specific acts of truthfulness or untruthfulness .... " This is
declarative of the federal case law construing the federal rule.
The Federal Rule advisory committee's note provides that opinion
testimony ought in general to "be confmed to the nature and extent of
observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based." Fed.
R. Evid. 405 advisory committee's note. The Maryland Reporter's
Note provides that "[t]he Committee envisions 'reasonable basis'
evidence as covering such matters as how long the witnesses have been
acquainted, under what circumstances, etc."

Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 708 n.6, 736 A.2d 307 (1999). The
"etc.," though meant to refer to matters of the same type as those
listed, has caused problems, in that it has been expansively
construed. See id. (f. infra).
f.

But Jensen, 355 Md. 692 (1999), has blurred the line. There the
Court of Appeals (over a dissent on this point by Judge Chasanow)
found that the trial court had erred in not permitting a defense
character witness to explain, in front of the jury, that the reason she
was of the opinion that one of the defendant's cohorts, a key
State's witness, was a "compulsive liar," was because he told her
"inconsistent stories about different things."
The trial judge had permitted her to testify before the jury
to how long she had known the State's witness and how often she
spoke with him.' It heard her testimony about "inconsistent

'The character witness, Melissa Goff, a tenth-grader, testified on direct:
DEFENSE ATI'Y: Could you telI the jury, if you know, if you're familiar with Brian Wooldridge?
GOFF: Yes, I am.
Q: Okay, and how are you familiar with Brian Wooldridge?
A: I've known him for a while.
Q: You say a while?

A: I guess about a year, even a little longer.
Q: Now, is this a year before this incident or a year up to now?

A: I guess a year before.
Q: And during that particular year, how many times did you meet in a week?
A: I guess once a week.

*******
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stories" outside the hearing of the jury, 2 before pelTI1itting her to

Q: Have you ever spoken to Mr. Wooldridge on the phone?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: And how many times have you spoken with him on the phone?
A: I usually speak to him every day.
Q: Okay, and when was that?
A: While he was out of school.
Q: And when was that?
A: I don't remember the exact months.
Q: And for what period of time did you speak to him every day-a week, two weeks, a month?
A: I guess for about a month. Yeah, a month.
Q: Okay, and do you have an opinion as to his veracity to tell the truth?

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained. Come forward, please, counsel. (Bench conference.)
STATE'S ATTORNEY: Insufficient, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do. I am going to excuse the jury, and I am going to conduct
-have counsel conduct an examination out of the presence of the jury. I don't believe at this stage you've
yet established that basis for her opinion, all right? Thank you.

*******
(The jury was excused from the courtroom.)
355 Md. at 695-96.

2THE COURT: Now, I sustained that objection on the basis that I conclude at this point there's not been
an adequate basis for that opinion to be given, but ... I'll give you the opportunity at least to attempt to
establish that basis while we're out of the presence of the jury.

*******
DEFENSE A TT'Y: In general, what would you talk about on the phone during that year that you knew
him?

*******
A: Just things, but he liked to talk about-I guess regular things that kids or normal teenagers would talk
about to each other.
Q: Would he tell you inconsistent stories about different things?
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testify to her opinion in front of the jury.3

A: Yes.
Q: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
["A lot of the stories that he told me didn't add up, saying that-one day he would tell me
something that happened on that day and then a couple of days later he would tell me something else that
had happened on that day that wouldn't have been able to happen if what he said before was true." Goff
added that this happened "repeatedly." Jensen v. State, Md. App., Sept. Term, 1997, No. 1768, at 14
(umeported), rev'd, 355 Md. 692).

*******
THE COURT: Under the circumstances, it seems to me that testimony given by Ms. Goff supports a basis
from the information for her perception of these conversations for giving evidence as to the truthfulness or
not ofMr. Wooldridge, and I'm going to allow this course of examination to continue.

*******
(The jury returned to the courtroom).
355 Md. at 697.
3DEFENSE A TT'Y: Do you have an opinion about Mr. Wooldridge's veracity to tell the truth?
A: Yes, urnQ: What is that opinion?
A: I think that he's a compulsive liar.
Q: What do you base that opinion on?
STATE'S ATT'Y: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
355 Md. at 697.
At the bench, the State argued that the defense had already laid the foundation and elicited the
desired opinion, adding: "It's our position that those are specific instances (inaudible). He's done what
he's been allowed to do under the rules, and that is (inaudible) opinion, and I don't think he should be
allowed to go any further." In response, defense counsel claimed that "telling stories over and over again"
was "not a specific act, that's an opinion." The trial court noted that Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) prohibits a
character witness from testifying about specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness and reasoned
that any response would be "sort of a continuum of events ... no more than a number of specific events
tied together, which I think will create the same mischief as is intended to be prevented by the rule .... "
When defense counsel asserted that "the jury has a right to know what the basis is," the court declared,
"No, I don't think that's it at all. I think you've gotten out of this witness on the subject what the rule
intends for you to be able to get."
Md. App. opinion at 15.
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In the majority opinion authored by Judge Raker, the Court
held that the procedure waS an erroneous abuse of discretion. 4 It
rejected the State's argument that "reasonable basis evidence
properly is limited to how long and under what circumstances the
witnesses have been acquainted." 355 Md. at 696. 5 The majority
characterized the excluded evidence as "not evidence of 'specific
instances, '" id. at 700, which it said would not be permitted on
direct.

4The majority found the error to be harmless, in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, dissented, on the ground that the error was so serious as to be
reversible.
5Judge

Chasanow, concurring and dissenting, concluded, on the other hand:

It is quite clear that [Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B)] is intended to allow the character witness to express the

reasonable basis for arriving at an opinion, not the reasonable basis for the opinion arrived at.

***
In order for a character witness to testify about the untruthful character or bad reputation for
truthfulness of another witness, the character witness should establish a basis of knowledge. * * *
In the instant case, the testimony at issue was that "[a] lot of the stories that he told me didn't add
up" and "one day he would tell me something that happened on that day and then a couple days later he
would tell me something [absolutely inconsistent with the fIrst version)." This testimony is far more
analogous to the prohibited specifIc acts of untruthfulness than to the permissible basis for knowledge of
the witness's character. I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in prohibiting this testimony.
355 Md. at 722, 724-26 (emphasis added).
The Court of Special Appeals similarly reasoned:
As we previously indicated, the substance of Goff s testimony in chambers was that Wooldridge
"repeatedly" told her things that turned out to be untrue. From appellant's perspective, this amounted to a
general statement about Wooldridge's character. From the trial court's perspective, however, Goffs
testimony concerned a pattern of conduct that was predicated on numerous specifIc occurrences. Because
Rule 5-608 permits, but does not mandate, introduction of evidence about the basis of the witness's belief,
the trial court properly weighed the value of Goffs testimony in establishing how she formed her opinion
against the danger that the jury would interpret her testimony as merely a summary of instances of
dishonesty, introduced in lieu of a detailed description of each instance.
It is clear from the record that the trial court was persuaded that the jury would perceive Goffs
testimony as a "continuum" of specifIc events. Nonetheless, the court permitted the witness to tell the jury
about the extent of her contact with appellant over a period of time. This testimony, if believed, indicated
that Goffs testimony was not a "bald conclusion" .... Indeed, Goffs description of how long, and under
what circumstances, she had known Wooldridge provided the jury with an ample basis to evaluate her
opinion. Therefore, we perceive no abuse of discretion ....
Md. App. opinion at 19.
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The majority acknowledged that "Rule 5-608
unquestionably intended to modify Maryland law, in particular,
Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988), to
the extent that specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness
were not admissible on direct examination of a witness." 355 Md.
at 706. As the majority aptly explained:
Maryland's Rule 608(a)(3)(B) is based on Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b), which in tum is related to Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) on
specific instances evidence. The advisory committee's note to Federal
Rule 405 explains that although specific instances are the most
convincing character evidence, that type of evidence also "possesses
the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to
consume time." See also COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND STANDfNG
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED TITLE
5 OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5-608
Reporter's Note (Subcommittee Draft 1991) (on file with Committee)
(explaining that "routinely permitting such proof would distract and
unduly influence juries and create too many time-consuming side
issues."). As these notes suggest, once a witness testifies to a specific
instance, the jury's focus necessarily turns to whether in fact that
particular event occurred and the circumstances surrounding that event.

Id. at 699-700 (emphasis added). Yet the majority concluded:
In contrast, because [the character witness's] statement that [the State's
witness] often told her mutually inconsistent stories spoke to a general
trait and not to particular occasions on which he lied, it would not serve
to distract and confuse the jury, nor would it consume time by altering
the focus of the trial to other particular events.

Id. at 700.
Quaere as to what happens, under this ruling, to the scope
of cross? Must not the opposing counsel be permitted to probe into
the specific "inconsistent stories," if counsel believes that will
show them to be insubstantial? The scope of cross becomes much
broader than simply asking about specific instances that did not go
to form the witness's opinion, but would lead to the opposite
opinion -- which is all that FRE 608( a) permits and that this writer
understood that Rule 5-608(a)(4) was intended to permit.
The Jensen majority states:
It is fair to infer from the Rule and its history that the committee felt
that a character witness was entitled to some latitude in informing the
jury as to the basis for an opinion, so long as that person avoids
venturing into the troublesome area of specific instances. Permitting
such latitude allows the witness, within reason, to offer something to
the jury beyond a bare conclusion that the witness "is a truthful person"
or "is not a truthful person." Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
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abused its discretion in restricting Goff s testimony to a description of
her acquaintance with Wooldridge and her conclusion that he was a
"compulsive liar."

Id. at 708 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). The difficult
question is, what is that "something more"? Where is the line
between "something more" and too much of "something more,"
i.e., "specific instances"? Judge Raker discussed the Jensen
character witness's proffered testimony as follows:
[She testified to] Wooldridge's tendency to tell mutually inconsistent
stories, i.e., his general tendency to be untruthful. Nor was her
testimony "no more than a number of specific events tied together."
She was not testifying as to several particular instances of conduct; she
was testifying as to a general behavior pattern which was the basis for
her opinion that Wooldridge was untruthfuL

Id. at 699.
Interestingly, both Hemingway and Jensen involved
character witnesses helpful to the accused. But if a criminal
accused testifies and thus subjects himself or herself to unfavorable
character witness's testimony regarding the accused's truthfulness,
Jensen would permit the State's witness to testify to "something
more" than opinion. And, clearly, Jensen applies to 5-608(a)
character witnesses in civil cases.
But what are the implications of Jensen, if any, as to Md.
Rule 5-405? Hemingway involved a 5-405-type witness, and was
discussed identically in the Rules Committee as to 5-405 and 5608. The Rules Committee's position was the same as to 5-405 as
it was as to 5-608, but unlike Rule 5-608, Md. Rule 5-405 is
identical, verbatim, to Federal Rule 405. If Jensen applies to Rule
5-405, if an accused opens the door under Rule 5-404(a)(l) to
evidence of his or her character trait pertinent to guilt or innocence,
the direct ofthe State's character witnesses also will be broader.
E.

Text of the Referenced Rules
RULE 5-404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE
TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally.
(1) In General. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confonnity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(A) Character of accused: Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
an accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
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(B) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(C) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness with
regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607, 5-608, and 5-609.

(2) Definitions. For purposes of subsections (a)(l )(A) and (B) of this
Rule, "accused" means a defendant in a criminal case and a child alleged to be
delinquent in an action in juvenile court, and for purposes of subsection
(a)(1)(B), "crime" includes a delinquent act as defmed by Code, Courts Article,
§ 3-80 l.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
RULE 5-405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
proof may also be made of relevant specific instances of that person's conduct.
RULE 5-406. HABIT; ROUTINE PRACTICE
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization
on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
RULE 5-607. WHO MAY IMPEACH
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling the witness.
RULE 5-608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF WITNESS
FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS
(a) Impeachment and Rehabilitation by Character Witnesses.
(1) Impeachment by a Character Witness. In order to attack the credibility
of a witness, a character witness may testify (A) that the witness has a reputation
for untruthfulness, or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is
an untruthful person.

(2) Rehabilitation by a Character Witness. After the character for
truthfulness of a witness has been attacked, a character witness may testify (A)
that the witness has a good reputation for truthfulness or (B) that, in the
character witness's opinion, the witness is a truthful person.
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(3) Limitations on Character Witness's Testimony.

(A) A character witness may not testify to an opinion as to whether a
witness testified truthfully in the action.
(B) On direct examination, a character witness may give a reasonable
basis for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to the character of the
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may not testify to specific
instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the witness.
(4) Impeachment of a Character Witness. The court may permit a
character witness to be cross-examined about specific instances in which a
witness has been truthful or untruthful or about prior convictions of the witness
as permitted by Rule 5-609. Upon objection, however, the court may permit the
inquiry only if (A) the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a
reasonable factual basis for asserting that the prior instances occurred or that the
convictions exist, and (B) the prior instances or convictions are relevant to the
witness's reputation or to the character witness's opinion, as appropriate.
(b) Impeachment by Examination Regarding Witness's Own Prior
Conduct Not Resulting in Convictions. The court may permit any witness to
be examined regarding the witness's own prior conduct that did not result in a
conviction but that the court finds probative of a character trait of
untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court may permit the inquiry only
if the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a reasonable factual
basis for asserting that the conduct of the witness occurred. The conduct may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence.

(c) Effect on Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The giving of
testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a
waiver ofthe witness's privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
Committee note: This Rule does not address proof of specific instances of
conduct when offered on some theory other than impeachment by past acts
indicative of a character trait of untruthfulness, such as evidence bearing on
bias, interest, hostility, motive to misrepresent, or inability to observe,
remember, or narrate. It also does not address the admissibility of evidence
under the "opened door" theory.
RULE 5-609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) Generally. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of
the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime
relevant to the witness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice to the witness or the objecting party.
Cross reference: Code, Courts Article, § 10-905.
Committee note: The requirement that the conviction, when offered for
purposes of impeachment, be brought out during examination of the witness is
for the protection of the witness. It does not apply to impeachment by evidence
of prior conviction of a hearsay declarant who does not testify.
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(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this
Rule if a period of more than 15 years has elapsed-since the date of the
conviction.
(c) Other Limitations. Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible
under section (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the judgment of
conviction is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an application
for leave to appeal has not expired.
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere. For purposes of this Rule,
"conviction" includes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, whether
or not the sentence is suspended.
Committee note: See Code, Courts Article, § 3-824 for the effect of juvenile
adjudications and for restrictions on their admissibility as evidence generally.
Evidence of these adjudications may be admissible under the Confrontation
Clause to show bias; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
RULE 5-616. IMPEACHMENT AND
REHABILIT ATION-GENERALL Y
(a) Impeachment by Inquiry of the Witness. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked through questions asked of the witness, including
questions that are directed at:
(1) Proving under Rule 5-613 that the witness has made statements that are
inconsistent with the witness's present testimony.

(2) Proving that the facts are not as testified to by the witness;
(3) Proving that an opinion expressed by the witness is not held by the
witness or is otherwise not worthy of belief;
(4) Proving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome
of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely;
(5) Proving lack of personal knowledge or weaknesses in the capacity of
the witness to perceive, remember, or communicate; or
(6) Proving the character of the witness for untruthfulness by (i)
establishing prior bad acts as permitted under Rule 5-608(b) or (ii) establishing
prior convictions as permitted under Rule 5-609.
(b) Extrinsic Impeaching Evidence.
(1) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may be admitted as
provided in Rule 5-613(b).

(2) Other extrinsic evidence contradicting a witness's testimony ordinarily
may be admitted only on non-collateral matters. In the court's discretion,
however, extrinsic evidence may be admitted on collateral matters.
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(3) Extrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify
falsely may be admitted whether or not the witness has been examined about the
impeaching fact and has failed to admit it.
(4) Extrinsic evidence ofa witness's lack of personal knowledge or
weaknesses in the capacity of the witness to perceive, remember, or
communicate may be admitted if the witness has been examined about the
impeaching fact and has failed to admit it, or as otherwise required by the
interests of justice.
(5) Extrinsic evidence of the character of a witness for untruthfulness may
be admitted as provided in Rule 5-608.
(6) Extrinsic evidence of prior convictions may be admitted as provided by
Rule 5-609.
(7) Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that prior consistent
statements offered under subsection (c)(2) of this Rule were not made.
(c) Rehabilitation. A witness whose credibility has been attacked may be
rehabilitated by:
(1) Permitting the witness to deny or explain impeaching facts, except that
a witness who has been impeached by prior conviction may not deny guilt of the
earlier crime;
(2) Except as provided by statute, evidence of the witness's prior
statements that are consistent with the witness's present testimony, when their
having been made detracts from the impeachment;
(3) Evidence through other witnesses of the impeached witness's character
for truthfulness, as provided in Rule 5-608(a); or
(4) Other evidence that the court fmds relevant for the purpose of
rehabilitation.
RULE 5-806. ATT ACKlNG AND SUPPORTING
CREDIBILITY OF DECLARANT
(a) In General. When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence,
the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be
supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the
declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the
declarant fl.t any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not
subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
(b) Exception. This Rule does not apply to statements by party-opponents
under Rule 5-803(a)(1) and (a)(2).
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